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INTRODUCTION
THE CHANGING FACE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT CONFRONTATION IN
THE LATE 1980st
Douglas E. Ray*
1. INTRODUCTION
The 1987-88 Annual Survey of Labor Relations and Employment
Discrimination Law discusses and analyzes a number of important
decisions in the area of labor and employment. law. To fully under-
stand the legal environment in which labor-management relations
function in the late 1980s, however, it is necessary to look beyond
the impact of individual decisions of courts and agencies. The pat-
terns and trends of decisions must be evaluated against the back-
drop of a changing economic and political environment. One such
pattern, the primary subject of this article, is a series of 1987-88
decisions of the National Labor Relations Board' which, when read
together, change the balance of economic weapons in a strike situ-
ation.
The labor-management bargaining relationship of the late
1980s is subject to a number of economic, social, and political pres-
sures. The internationalization of at least parts of the economy and
an increasing focus on "bottom line" concerns by business have
caused managers to take a tougher stance at the bargaining table. 2
On the union side, short-term means of avoiding confrontation over
management demands for reductions, such as two-tier wage plans,
have proved unpopular with the membership and are less available. 3
t Copyright 0 1988 by Boston College Law School
* Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law; B.A., University of -Minnesota;
J.D„ Harvard University Law School. The author thanks Ms. Lin Whalen for her expert
assistance.
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) is an adjudicative body heading
the federal agency bearing the same name. Section 3(a) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, provides that the Board shall consist of five members "appointed by the Presi-
dent by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1982).
2 See infra notes 1'2-15 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
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Further, employers in the 1980s have seemed more resistant to
union organization, more willing to replace striking workers with
others during a strike, and less willing to recall strikers at the end
of the strike. 4
 At the same time, there is a call for increased coop-
eration in the workplace and for a new cooperative era in labor
relations.`'
It is against this backdrop that recent decisions of the National
Labor Relations Board, which seem to limit and undercut the ef-
fectiveness of the strike weapon, must be evaluated. The strike
weapon is at the core of Section 7 employee rights." A private sector
labor union's ability to bargain effectively depends on its perceived
willingness to strike and management's perceived ability and will-
ingness to sustain a strike. Thus, an effective strike weapon is the
engine that provides power to achieve a union's bargaining objec-
tives. Although the legally required processes of bargaining provide
an incentive for both parties to communicate and settle, often the
perceived bargaining power of each side generates the final conces-
sions that lead to settlement. For the union, that bargaining power
is the threat of a strike.
This article begins by examining the economic and political
developments that will put increasing pressure on the bargaining
environment.' Against this backdrop, the article then evaluates cur-
rent changes in the law that adversely affect strikers' job security
and undercut striking unions' strength. 8
 Finally, this article discusses
ways in which unions and society may be expected to deal with these
developments. 9
II. THE CHANGING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
The labor relations environment of the I980s has been affected
by both economic and political changes that cannot be ignored. As
See infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
5 See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
"Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, '29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982), provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, arid shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right
may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization
as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3) of this title.
7 See infra notes 10-27 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 28-132 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 133-43 and accompanying text.
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Professor and former Secretary of Labor John T. Dunlop notes,
macroeconomic policies have had a great impact.'" He suggests that
tax reductions and expanded defense expenditures have combined
to create "unprecedented budget deficits" and that tight money and
high interest rates created "a severe recession and an over-valued
dollar and unprecedented trade deficits," making the United States
the "largest debtor nation."" These changes, Professor Dunlop rea-
sons, make the labor relations parties increasingly subject to inter-
national, competition. The move to floating exchange rates, the
relocation of United States production facilities abroad, and the
establishment of foreign-owned.manufacturing plants in the United
States accentuate this trend toward an international marketplace.
Consequently, management and labor in the United States no
longer bargain in a closed environment. A company cannot always
agree to match an industry standard for wages and benefits, secure
in the knowledge that the union will impose the same standard on
the competition. Much of the competition is not domestic. Even
among domestic competitors, many operate in a non-union envi-
ronment. Both employers and unions must be alert to competitive
changes that may cost a company its market share and, conse-
quently, cost the union jobs.
The degree to which current economic pressures have affected
or will affect the industrial relations atmosphere and the labor
management relationship is the subject of much debate. Audrey
Freedman of the Conference Board argues that external forces in
the form of foreign competition, deregulation, and non-union com-
panies have wrought "profound changes" in the 1980s." She sug-
gests that these external forces pressure employers to consider com-
petitive wage costs at the product-line level.'s New wage techniques
designed to make wages more flexibly responsive to competitive
pressures include two-tier plans, which specify that new hirees will
receive lower rates of pay than those received by senior employees,
annual lump sum wage payments in lieu of permanent hourly wage
raises, and means by which some wages are linked to profit or
output. She suggests, too, that management is under pressure to
make employment levels more flexible by contracting out work
Dunlop, Have the 1980's Changed U.S. Industrial Relations?, MONTHLY LAB. REV., May
1988, at 29, 30.
' Id.
L2 Freedman, How the 1980's Have Changed Industrial Relations, MONTHLY LAB. REV., May
1988, at 35.
' 5 Id. at 37.
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more often and using more part-time, independent or free-lance
workers.'`' She sees the pressures from the outside business world
as unlikely to relent and thus predicts that the changes of the 1980s
are unlikely to be reversed.'''
Professor Dunlop agrees that new international pressures,
demographic changes, technological changes, and deregulation
have affected the labor relations environment."' He believes, how-
ever, that reactions of the early 1980s, such as two tier wage systems
and lump sum payments in lieu of wage increases, are "reversible
and are passing."' 7 Thus, Professor Dunlop views many of the
changes of the 1980s as temporary and believes that basic industrial
relations in this country have not changed. In his view, "[t]he labor
movement in the United States is here to stay" and is changing to
meet new conditions.'s
The issues raised in this debate are important because they
help define future pressures on the system. As Professor Dunlop
has suggested, two-tier wage plans have become increasingly un-
popular with unions, and, since 1986, have been included or re-
tained in fewer and fewer collective bargaining agreements.'`' With-
out such compromises to deflect, albeit temporarily, management
pressures for reduced wages and benefits, we can expect more direct
confrontations between labor and management over economic is-
sues.
On the political and social front, there are growing perceptions
that the current. system fails to protect. employees. Northwestern
University President Arnold Weber, a labor economist and arbitra-
tor, argues that a dramatic change in American industrial relations
has occurred, marked by a "precipitate decline in the relative
strength of trade unions," adoption by management of alternate
means by which to structure the work force, and a shift in emphasis
14 Id.
15 Id. at 38.
16 Dunlop, supra note 10, at 33.
17 1d.
" Id.
19 Two-Tier Wage Plans, 127 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 305, 305 (March 7, 1988); see also Wall
Street Journal, June 29, 1988, at 17, col. 2:
One modest success for labor is that two-tier wage schemes, which set lower pay
for new employees, are less in vogue this year. In the face of strong union
opposition, many companies are trying other ways to hold down labor costs.
What they are pushing is elimination or weakening of cost-of-living clauses,
greater links between compensation and corporate performance, and more
emphasis on lump-sum payments that don't step up the wage base.
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from "industrial relations" to "human resources." 20 He suggests,
too, that the "rules of the game" have changed, with the federal
government no longer perceived as an advocate of stable collective
bargaining relationships and employers increasingly willing to un-
dermine bargaining arrangements through use of bankruptcy laws,
contracting out, and continuing operations during strikes. 21
In an opening statement at the March 9, 1988 House oversight
hearings on the National Labor Relations Board, Representative
William L. Clay, a Democrat from Missouri, stated that the National
Labor Relations Act is being used to frustrate collective bargaining:
"In spite of the Act's stated intention, those who support unions do
so at considerable risk and with little confidence that their efforts
will result in a bargaining agreement." 22 Hearings will focus on cases
where employers have refused to reach agreement or have sought
to end longstanding bargaining relationships. Representative Clay
has expressed concern over the difficulties caused employees by the
increasing number of employers that either refuse to enter into
contracts with newly elected unions or find "a variety of new ways
to walk away from longstanding collective bargaining relation-
ships.""
At the same time as some authorities are pointing to potential
"polarization" in labor-management relations, others see a more
cooperative workplace developing in which cooperation is replacing
confrontation. 24 To those who suggest an end to the adversarial
20 Criticism of Failure to Anticipate IR Changes, 127 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 54, 54 (fan. 11,
1988).
21 hi. at 55.
22 House Hearings on Labor Board, 127 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 370, 370 (Mar, 21, 1988).
ss Id. at 570-71. Professor Thomas Kochan has described the 1980s as a period of
"increasing polarization" in labor management relations because of "more hitter" labor stop-
pages, increased employer resistance to unions, and a hostile relationship between the federal
government and unions, Labor's Polarization, 127 Lab, Rel. Rep. (BNA) 381, 381 (Mar. 21,
1988). fie suggests that we cannot continue to build a more competitive industrial relations
system through greater employee participation and flexibility unless something is done to
prevent the system from becoming more adversarial. Professor Kochan recommends that
management "examine long-term business strategies and basic values" and "back off from a
deep resistance to unions," Id. To oppose unionization in one part of the company and
expect cooperation in a unionized sector is, according to Kochan, "no longer tenable." Id.
Union leaders "cannot afford to sit on the fence," he added. Id,
21 The twenty two member Collective Bargaining Forum, chaired by Steelworkers Pres-
ident Lynn Williams and Ameritech Chairman William Weiss, has recommended, in a report
published by the United States Department of Labor, a new and more constructive relation-
ship between labor and management "which places greater value on the contributions that
unions can make to achieving the basic goals of a democratic society and to the competitive-
ness of the firms in which their members are employed." The forum calls upon management
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relationship, however, Professor Dunlop responds that cooperation
is not new and that it is not likely to supplant the current system of
representation. 25 First, he notes that labor-management committees
have a long history in this country and England and have arisen at
"times when economic difficulties threatened the viability of both
parties ... [and] collective bargaining alone had proved to be an
inadequate forum for addressing each and every pressing issue." 26
Second, Professor Dunlop suggests that once the crisis has passed,
the committee may disappear because of personnel changes, man-
agement concerns over sharing information, difficulties inherent in
participatory management, and concerns of union leaders that they
not seem too collaborative to their constituents. 27
These changes in the business environment, in employers' at-
titudes toward unions, and in society's expectations of the bargain-
ing relationship place new pressures on the labor laws. If the inter-
nationalization of the economy and other competitive factors press
the company to demand wage reductions in the future, such stop-
gap measures as two-tier systems will no longer be available. This
means that the union's ability to withstand pressures at the bargain-
ing table will be directly tested. Therefore, the degree of legal
protection afforded the union and its members at the bargaining
table and on the picket line will be most important.
Moreover, if ours is to evolve into the cooperative and com-
petitive workplace and economy that many say is necessary, man-
agement, too, must have incentives or pressures to surrender both
information and autonomy. If the union is weakened and if the
strike is no longer a viable weapon, management will have less
to "take a long-run view of its interests and broaden its goals to include the need for
employment security and a rising standard of living for America's workers." New Ideas For
Labor Relations, 127 Lab. Rel. Rep. (DNA) 465,465 (Apr. 1 1, 1988). Others are less sanguine
about the effectiveness and value of such cooperative programs as participatory management
and quality circles. In a speech opening the International Association-of Machinists Centen-
nial Convention, Machinists President William Winpisinger attacked management's failure
to give unions a say in important decisions like the investment of capital and development
of equipment and jobs: "lf our employers want our cooperation and a love-in on the shop
floor, then why do they rape us on the fainting couch of job blackmail and concessions, and
make book with the Reaganites outside in the political economy-at-large? Why do they?"
Machinists Hold Centennial Convention, 127 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 45,45 (May 9, 1988); see also
Grenier, Quality Circles in a Corporate Antiunion Strategy: A Case Study, 13 LAB. STUD. J. 5
(1988).
" Dunlop, supra note 10, at 32-33.
26 Id. at 32 (quoting LABOR MANAGEMENT SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT
Or LABOR, THE OPERATION OF AREA LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES 25 (1981)).
" Id. at 33.
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incentive to surrender any of its prerogatives. This could lead many
managers to press their advantage to create a less cooperative work-
place.
Finally, the survival of union representation in an anti-union
environment is at stake. If, in response to initial union refusals to
agree to management demands, management is easily allowed to
avoid agreement, replace union workers with those willing to cross
picket lines, and ultimately withdraw recognition from the union,
then employees' Section 7 rights to representation will be damaged.
III. DEVELOPMENTS AT THE NLRB
When management and labor cannot agree at the bargaining
table, the primary means by which a union can exert pressure is
the strike. Decisions of the National Labor Relations Board in the
1987-88 Survey period, when read together, undercut the effective-
ness of the strike weapon. Management has been allowed to increase
and toughen its demands at the bargaining table, seemingly in
retaliation for a strike." Management has also been allowed to
discharge strikers for an ever broadening range of picket line activ-
ities," and to retain permanent replacements despite union claims
that strikes were precipitated and prolonged by employer unfair
labor practices. 3° In addition, management has been allowed to
recall laid off replacement workers even where strikers had already
unconditionally offered to return to work. 3 ' Finally, employers have
been allowed to withdraw recognition from unions in situations
where employee disaffection may well have been caused by the
employer's refusal to bargain at reasonable times. 32 In this legal
environment, the rights of a striking employee and his or her union
are increasingly vulnerable.
A. Post-Strike Bargaining Strategy
Two recent cases, Hendrick Manufacturing Co. 33 and Cook Brothers
Enterprises," address the issue of an employer's post-strike bargain-
ing strategy and seem to suggest that a union's strike gives an
23 See infra notes 33-61 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 62-78 and accompanying text.
"° See infra notes 79-94 and accompanying text.
n See infra notes 95-111 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 123-32 and accompanying text.
" 287 N.L.R.B. No. 33, slip op., 127 L.R.R.M. 1097 (1987).
34 288 N.L.R.B. No. 46, slip op.,128 L.R.R.M. 1074 (1988).
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employer an opportunity to "harden its approach" in response. In
Hendrick Manufacturing the union and employer, parties with a forty
year bargaining relationship, began negotiating for a new collective
bargaining agreement to replace one due to expire in September,
1984. Between July, 1984 and December, 1985, the parties met
twenty-one times for bargaining and exchanged numerous propos-
als. A strike began in November, 1984. 35 The administrative law
judge found that from March, 1985 through the parties' last meet-
ing in December, 1985, the employer bargained in bad faith with a
fixed intention of avoiding agreement and by taking positions "cal-
culated to impede the union's effectiveness as an employee repre-
sentative." 36 The employer proposals eliminated superseniority for
union stewards, narrowed access to the grievance procedure and
arbitration, limited the access of union representatives to the prem-
ises, and withdrew union security." The administrative law judge
specifically found that employer proposals became more regressive
whenever the union indicated it was prepared to make concessions
and that the bloc of proposals limiting union rights went beyond
the employer's alleged economic reasons and were "contrived in
bad faith for the purpose of perpetuating nonagreement by inflam-
ing the union negotiators."38 Despite these explicit findings sup-
ported by a lengthy and detailed opinion, the National Labor Re-
lations Board ruled that the employer had met its bargaining
obligation by meeting regularly, presenting proposals, explaining
its position, agreeing to the presence of federal mediators, and
otherwise meeting its procedural obligations. 39 Rather than finding
vindictiveness, the Board held that "any toughening or regression
in [the employer's] bargaining posture was a direct result of its
improved economic condition and its ability to survive the Union's
strike. "40
In a similar case, Cook Brothers, the parties, who had a forty
year bargaining relationship, negotiated for a new collective bar-
gaining agreement after the former agreement expired on Septem-
ber 1, 1979. 41 The parties were unable to agree. Management of-
" 287 N.L.R.B. No. 33, slip op. at 2, 127 L.R.R.M. at 1097.
Id, at 2-3, 127 L.R.R.M. at 1097.
"287 N.L.R.B. No. 33, slip op. at 3 (opinion or Wilks,
3' Id. at 32.
"Id. at 5, 127 L.R.R.M. at 1098.
" Id. at 3, 127 L.R.R.M. ai 1097.
4' 288 N.L.R.B. No. 46, slip op. at 2, 128 L.R.R.M. 1074, 1075 (1988).
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fered the same wages and conditions as under the last contract, but
did not meet the union's request that area wage rates be maintained
as they had been in the past. On January 21, 1980, a strike began.
On February 5, 1980, the parties met, and the company announced
its adherence to its prior offer with two exceptions. The company
withdrew its offer of retroactivity on wages and pension contribu-
tions and stated that it wanted to eliminate the union-security clause.
It also stated that it intended to hire permanent replacements.
Management hired replacements while the strike continued, and
did not retreat from its position through the last meeting of the
parties in July, 1980. 42
 After an unfair labor practice charge was
filed, a hearing was held. The administrative law judge found that
there was no evidence of bad faith before February 5, but that after
February 5, the company demonstrated an intent to frustrate bar-
gaining by rigidly insisting on elimination of the long-established
union-security provision. The judge concluded that the totality of
the employer's conduct demonstrated it had engaged in bad-faith
surface bargain i n g. 43
The Board reversed the judge's finding of unlawful bargaining
conduct. The Board noted that the employer had economic reasons
for failing to adopt the area wage rate and further stated that it
was "only after the Union took this hardened stance" — the strike
— that the company, "in turn, hardened its approach" by maintain-
ing its economic approach, withdrawing retroactivity on pay and
pension contributions, proposing elimination of union-security, and
announcing its intent to use replacements. 44
Because the employer was financially troubled, the Board
found the elimination of retroactivity not to be regressive or baseless
because the strike created additional economic pressure. 45 With
respect to the elimination of union-security, the Board noted, first,
that the existence of a clause in previous contracts does not require
the parties to include it in further contracts 4" and that a party is
free to modify its bargaining proposals during the course of nego- .
42 Id. at 2-4, 128 L.R.R.M. at 1075,
13 Id. at 4-5, 128 L.R.R.M. at 1075.
"Id. at 5-6, 128 L.R.R.M. at 1075-76.
45 Id. at 6, 128 L.R.R.M. at 1076.
ar Id. (citing U.K. Porter v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 103-09, 73 L.R.R.M. 2561, 2562-65
(1970); Frontier Dodge, Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 722, 730 n.24, 117 L.R.R.M. 1411 (1984) (opinion
of Kennedy, A.L.J.); American Thread Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 1112, 1112-13, 118 L.R.R.M.
1499, 1500 (1985)).
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tiations. The Board relied on the decision by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Atlas Metal Parts Co. v.
NLRB,47 and stated that "the employer had countered the Union's
show of strength (the strike) by seeking to curtail an aspect of
the Union's strength (the union-security clause)," as well as by ex-
panding its economic position and strengthening its position by use
of replacement workers. These steps were viewed as "reasonable, if
not predictable, reactions of management facing difficult economic
conditions and a tough union counterpart."'"
Finally, the Board rejected the administrative law judge's reli-
ance on the employer's continued adherence to its demand to drop
the union-security clause as proof of a desire to frustrate bargaining.
The Board stated that a party may hold to a legitimate bargaining
proposal and concluded that the General Counsel had failed to
produce'sufficient evidence to show that the employer "asserted its
proposal disingenuously or was unwilling to discuss it with the
Union."" The Board held the employer's adherence to eliminating
union-security to be a reasonable bargaining stance under all the
circumstances. 5" As a consequence of the Board's ruling that the
employer had not bargained in bad faith, the strike was not deemed
to have become an unfair labor practice strike by the March 10,
1980 date that permanent replacements were hired.51 Replaced
employees were held entitled only to preferential rehiring rights
for openings that did not develop until February, 1981. 52 The strike
later was converted to an unfair labor practice strike when the
employer unlawfully interrogated strike replacements and unlaw-
fully withdrew recognition from the union."
4' 660 F.2d 304, 108 L.R.R.M. 2474 (7th Cir. 1981). The Adas Metal Parts court stated
that:
Lain employer is entitled to advance a position sincerely held, notwithstanding
the employer's having taken a different position at an earlier time .... Union
security ... [is a] mandatory [subject] of bargaining, and party . . . is entitled
to stand Firm on a position if he [or she) reasonably believes that it is fair and
proper or that he has sufficient bargaining strength to force agreement by the
other party."
Id. at 308, 108 L.R.R.M. at 2477 (citations omitted).
18 288 N.L.R.B. No. 46, slip op. at 7, 128 L.R.R.M. at 1076.
49 Id. at 8, 128 L.R.R.M. at 1076.
5" Id. (citing Atlas Metal Parts Co. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 304, 308, 108 L.R.R.M. 2474,
2477-78 (7th Cir. 1981); Atlanta Hilton & Tower, 271 N.L.R.B. 1600, 1603, 117 L.R.R.M.
1224, 1227 (1984)).
31 Id. at 10, 128 L.R.R.M. at 1076.
32 1d. at 11, 128 L.R.R.M. at 1077.
39 Id. at 10-11, 128 L.R.R.M. at 1077.
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These two cases are troubling because they seem to open the
door for employers to engage in regressive bargaining after a strike,
because they overrule factual findings by administrative law judges
with little apparent basis, and because they change precedent to
allow punitive bargaining. Although there is precedent for the
proposition that withdrawing a union-security clause is not neces-
sarily bad faith bargaining, the Cook Brothers Enterprises and Hendrick
Manufacturing Co. decisions go beyond such precedent. In its 1980
Olin Corp. decision, for example, the Board held that the employer
did not unlawfully withdraw a union-security clause after hiring
replacements and learning of their concern over joining the union
where the employer gave its reasons to the union and was willing
to discuss the matter in bargaining. 54
 Both Hendrick Manufacturing
and Cook Brothers, however, go beyond the Board's decision in Olin.
In Hendrick Manufacturing, the administrative law judge found
the company president to have misrepresented the truth when he
testified that he withdrew union-security because the sixty employ-
ees who crossed the picket line told him they did not want to join
the union and asked whether they could be so compelled. 55 When
the employer made its proposal, only thirty, not sixty, replacements
had been hired. Because these hirings had been gradual, the judge
found it unlikely that even all thirty would have communicated with
the employer on this subject. 55
 Further, the president did not testify
as to the circumstances of such conversations nor provide the name
of even one person who allegedly made such a remark. In the
circumstances, and in light of the judge's conclusions as to the
overall bad faith of the employer's bargaining conduct, the judge
concluded that the statements about replacements were a mere
pretext for regressive bargaining. 57
In Cook Brothers, the gap between prior precedent and the
Board's ruling is even more obvious. The administrative law judge
found that the employer had not even hired replacement workers
when it announced its intent to withdraw the union-security clause
and that the employer provided no explanation nor evidenced a
willingness to discuss the matter. 58
 Thus, the judge concluded that
the employer's withdrawal of the union-security clause was in bad
faith.
" 248 N.L.R.B. 1137, 1141, 104 L.R.R.M. 1017, 1018 (1980).
55
 287 N.L.R.B. No. 33, slip op. at 25, 30 (opinion of Wilks,
56 Id.
57 Id. at 31.
5a
	 N.L.R.B. No, 46, slip op. at 16 (1987).
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Although the current Board does protect the union's role at
the bargaining table in some cases, 59 Hendrick Manufacturing and
Cook Brothers may be dangerous precedent if employers decide to
test their limits by regressively bargaining after a strike is declared.
The stakes are high. The job status of strikers replaced after such
regressive bargaining depends on whether the bargaining was un-
lawful and, if so, whether it prolonged the strike." As in Cook
Brothers, the toughened bargaining stance may be a prelude to an
attempt to withdraw recognition from the union.61
B. Picket Line Activity
Recent decisions of the National Labor Relations Board seem
to expand the range of picket line activities that the Board will deem
unprotected and for which an employee may be discharged. In the
" I n Armored Transport of California, Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. No. 70, slip op., 128 L.R.R.M.
1081 (1988), the union struck alter the employer implemented its proposals to reduce
employee wages. When the reductions were implemented, the employer sent all employees
a letter justifying the step due to customer losses and decreased revenues and increased costs.
The letter stated, "[w]hat this all adds up to is that Armored Transport can no longer pay
its employees from two to seven dollars more per hour than the competitors who are taking
our business and your jobs." Id. at 2-3, 128 L.R.R.M. at 1081. The union later requested the
employer to provide information in order that it "may be able to bargain intelligently for
collective bargaining agreements." Id. at 3, 128 L.R.R.M. at 1081. Although certain items
were provided, the employer refused to furnish the following items: copies of correspondence
with customers regarding rate changes necessitated by employee wage rates; profit-and-loss
statements for all facilities for recent years; compensation records for officers, directors,
shareholders, and management employees; and information regarding investments made in
all facilities. The employer explained its refusal by stating that it "is not now nor has it ever
claimed an inability to pay" and added that its bargaining posture was driven by a need to
"bring its wage costs per truck in line with the competition in order to remain competitive."
Id.
The Board found that under NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 38 L.R.R.M. 2042
(1956), the employer had a duty to provide the financial information requested. 288 N.L.R.B.
No. 70, slip op. at 4, 128 L.R.R.M. at 1082. Although noting that "a mere assertion of such
competitive pressures is not necessarily a claim of inability to pay ... ", the Board held that
the employer had gone beyond such an assertion and that references to the competition, the
"no longer can pay" language, and discussion of substantial financial losses, made the letter,
in its entirety, a claim of inability to pay. Id. at 6-7, 128 L.R.R.M. at 1082. Thus, held the
Board, good faith bargaining required the employer to provide the union with information
relevant to its financial status so that the union could assess, for itself, the true financial status
of the employer's operations. Id. at 7, 128 L.R.R.M. at 1083.
"" 1 n Cook Brothers Enterprises, the Board's ruling meant that the strike was not an unfair
labor practice strike by the time permanent replacements were hired. 288 N.L.R.B. No. 46,
slip op. at 10, 128 L.R.R.M. 1074, 1077. Thus, replaced employees were entitled only to
preferential rehiring as vacancies developed. Id. at 11, 128 L.R.R.M. at 1077.
For a discussion of withdrawal of recognition, see infra notes 123-32 and accompany-
ing text.
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Board's 1984 decision in Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., both the plurality
and the concurring opinion adopted as the standard for striker
misconduct serious enough to permit the employer to refuse rein-
statement, that which "under the circumstances existing . . . may
reasonably tend to coerce or intimidate employees in the exercise
of rights protected under the Act." 62 In the 1987 decision in G.S.M.,
Inc., this standard was interpreted to allow discharge of employees
for kicking and slapping vehicles crossing the picket line."' Later
decisions have further expanded the reach of Clear Pine Mouldings.
In Gem Urethane Corp., a case important for its allocation of the
burden of proof, the Board ruled that the strike misconduct of five
strikers exceeded the scope of protected strike activity and was
sufficient to allow the employer to refuse them reinstatement." One
striker allegedly blocked an exit gate with his car and held a baseball
bat in a threatening manner as non-strikers attempted to use the
gate. Another allegedly blocked a non-striker's entrance to the
plant, moving only when approached by the employer's vice presi-
dent. A third striker allegedly pounded on a car being driven by a
non-striker. A fourth allegedly helped surround a non-striker's car,
beat on the car and screamed "I'll kill you," as well as allegedly
threatening another non-striker that he would be beaten up. The
fifth striker allegedly told one non-striker that if he went to Work
the strikers would "blow up the plant" or that he was "going to get
a visit at his house," and allegedly told another non-striker that they
would burn hercar."" The conduct of another striker who allegedly,
while in a drunken state, told a non-striker he was "going to kick
[his] ass" was found insufficient to deny the striker reinstatement
because it was "common banter" and had "no necessarily violent
connotation ."""
The Gem Urethane Board defined the order and allocation of
proof in striker misconduct cases by stating that an employer that
refuses reinstatement of a worker on the grounds of strike miscon-
duct must show that it had an "honest belief" that the striker had
committed serious strike misconduct. If the employer meets this
standard, then the General Counsel is to come forward with evi-
dence showing that the striker did not engage in the misconduct in
62 268 N.L.R.B. 1044, 1046, 1048, 115 L.R.R.M. 1113, 1114-15, 1118 (1984) (quoting
NLRB v. W.C. McQuaide, Inc., 552 F.2(1 519, 528, 94 L.R.R.M, 2950, 2955 (3d Cir. 1977)).
6.9
	N.L.R.B. No. 22, slip op. at 3-4, 125 L.R.R.M. 1133, 1134-35 (1987).
64
 284 N.L.R.B. No. 122, slip op. at 14-15, 126 L.R.R.M. 1092, 1097-98 (1987).
61 Id.
66 Id. at 15 n.21, 126 L.R.R.M. at 1098 n.21.
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question or that such misconduct was not serious enough to prevent
reinstatement. "At all times, the burden of proving discrimination
is that of the General Counsel."67 Applying this standard, the Board
held that the administrative law judge had misallocated the burden
of proof by requiring the employer to prove the alleged strike
misconduct on which the refusal to reinstate twelve strikers was
based.68
 The Board found that the employer had met its burden by
showing "a valid basis for an honest belief that the strikers were
responsible for strike misconduct serious enough" for the employer
to deny reinstatement even though there was no direct evidence of
misconduct introduced into evidence. 69 The Board held that the
issuance of an NLRB complaint against the union alleging striker
misconduct by the named strikers was sufficient to give the em-
ployer a valid basis for its belief because "the Acting Regional Di-
rector would not have issued the complaint without a prior admin-
istrative determination that the alleged unfair labor practices set
forth in the complaint had been committed." 7° Because the General
Counsel failed to show that the alleged misconduct did not occur
or that any misconduct that did occur was not serious enough for
denial of reinstatement, the Board concluded that the employer's
refusal to reinstate the strikers was not illega1. 7 '
Another case extending an employer's ability to discharge strik-
ers was Tube Craft, Inc., in which the Board held that five strikers
engaged in picket line misconduct that went beyond the limits of
protected concerted activity in January, 1985, and thus could be
legally discharged by the employer in December, 1985. 72 On Janu-
ary 2, a picketing striker was found to have stopped walking back
and forth and to have stood still in front of the driveway entrance
to the plant while a truckdriver was attempting to back his truck in.
The truck did not enter until police instructed picketers to move.
The next day a group of picketers occupied the driveway until
police arrived. On January 9, an exiting truck "was delayed for
approximately 2-1/2 minutes" as picketers coordinated their pa-
trolling to ensure that at least one of them was in the truck's path.
On January 10, a truck was delayed approximately fifteen minutes
and, later that day, another truck was delayed until police officers
47 Id. at 11-12, 126 L.R.R.M. at 1096.
68 /d. at 12, 126 L.R.R.M. at 1096-97.
69 Id, at 13, 126 L.R.R.M. at 1097.
"id. at 12-13, 126 L.R.R.M. at 1097.
71 Id. at 13, 126 L.R.R.M. at 1097.
72 287 N.L.R.B. No. 51, slip op. at 8-9, 127 L.R.R.M. 1234, 1237 (1987).
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arrived and talked with the strikers." The Board majority in Tube
Craft read Clear Pine Mouldings to reach the conduct of the strikers
here. The Board stated that whether or not blocking access is, per
se, the type of conduct for which reinstatement may be denied, the
conduct at issue was sufficiently coercive and intimidating to the
truck-drivers involved to justify discharge. The Board stated that:
"[a]lthough peaceful picketing unquestionably includes the right to
make nonthreatening appeals to those who are about to cross a
picket line, the decision of such persons to ignore such appeals must
be respected," and noted that the obstructions in question took place
after the truckdrivers had decided to cross the picket line." The
Board found that all the discharged strikers except one had partic-
ipated in at least two obstructions and that the other had stood in
the path of a truck at one point during a Fifty minute obstruction.
On these grounds, the Board ruled that they had thus engaged in
a pattern of conduct justifying discharge. Although the administra-
tive law judge had inferred from the delay of almost one year
between conduct. and discharge that the asserted misconduct was
only a pretext, the Board disagreed. It found that because the
strikers' positions had been filled by permanent replacements, the
employer had no need to take action in January. The Board found
further that in December when the strikers renewed their offer to
return to work, it had reason to clarify its position." The Board
ruled that the employer had reserved its rights by telling the union
on January 9 that the fact it was treating strikers "as permanently
replaced does not constitute a waiver of any of Tube Craft's legal
rights with regard to picket line misconduct." 7"
Cases like Gem Urethane Corp. and Tube Craft go beyond Clear
Pine Mouldings and make it yet easier to discharge strikers. The
allocation of the burden of' proof in Gem Urethane is curious. No
evidence of misconduct was submitted at. hearing. Allowing an em-
ployer to satisfy a "reasonable belief" test in such a situation does
not create confidence in the process of adjudication.
Also, the discharges for blocking access in Tube Craft may fail
to recognize that at least some confrontation is part of picket line
activity. To hold that employees can be Fired for delaying a truck
2-1/2 minutes by coordinating their picket line patrolling is to in-
73 /d. at 3-6, 127 L.R.R.M. at 1235-36.
" Id. at 6-8, 127 L.R.R.M. at 1236.
75 Id. at 8-9, 127	 at 1237.
m Id. at 2, 8, 127 L.R.R.M. at 1235, 1237.
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terfere with the right to strike. The Board concluded the activity
was "threatening" even though employees complied with police
instructions and delays were not generally long. Employers often
deal with problems of mass picketing or blocking access to a plant
by obtaining state court injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct."
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that states have a valid
interest in preventing violence and that federal labor law does not
preempt state court jurisdiction in such cases." Thus, an employer
possesses the means to protect its valid interests without discharging
every employee who temporarily blocks access. To uphold discharge
for all the incidents involved in Tube Craft, especially where the
employer delayed eleven months before announcing the discharges,
is to invite employers to discharge more and more strikers. The
discharge of workers under uncertain standards subjects both em-
ployer and employee to years of delay awaiting the outcome of
unfair labor practice litigation. There is admittedly a fine line be-
tween protected confrontation and other types of unprotected ac-
tivity. The Board needs to define this line more precisely, rather
than assume that otherwise peaceful activity is "threatening" merely
because it inconveniences the employer.
C. Unfair Labor Practice Strikes
Recent decisions of the Board also affect the important question
of whether a strike can be designated an "unfair labor practice
strike." It is well settled that the standard for determining whether
a strike is an unfair labor practice strike is whether it is caused "in
whole or in part" by an unfair labor practice on the part of the
employer." The rule was recently restated by the Board in L.A.
Water Treatment, Division of Chromalloy American Corp.:
Employees are unfair labor practice strikers if an employ-
er's unlawful conduct contributed in part to their decision
to strike, even though their decision also may have been
influenced by economic issues. However, the Board has
long recognized that unfair labor practices may precede
a strike without being a cause of the strike. A causal con-
77
 See Gordon, Preemption and Mass Picketing-- Recent Cases and Developments, 4 LAB. Law.
45, 49-52 (Winter 1988).
7 ' United Auto., Aircraft & Agricultural Implement Workers of Am. v. Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266, 274-75, 38 L.R.R.M. 2165, 2168 (1956).
79
 E.g., Citizens Nat'l Bank of Willmar, 245 N.L.R.B. 389, 591, 102 L.R.R.M. 1467, 1469
(1979); Tufts Bros., 235 N.L.R.B. 808, 810, 98 L.R.R.M. 1204, 1206 (1978).
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nection between the unfair labor practices and the strike
must be demonstrated in order to establish that employees
are unfair labor practice strikers."
The issue is a critical one because if a strike is labelled an "unfair
labor practice strike," an employer must reinstate strikers upon their
unconditional offer to return to work. If a strike is not deemed to
have been caused, at least in part, by employer unfair practices, an
employer may retain permanent replacements and not recall stri-
kers until vacancies occur. 8 '
If an employer commits a single glaring unfair labor practice,
the issue of causation is not too difficult. In Michigan Ladder Co., for
example, the Board found that the cause of a strike was the em-
ployer's unlawful unilateral subcontracting of work." In concluding
that the strike was caused by the unfair labor practice, the Board
gave substantial weight to the union's continuous and vigorous ob-
jections to the subcontracting throughout the course of bargain-
ing."
In cases where numerous unfair labor practices have been al-
leged, however, unions have faced more difficulty in establishing
causation. In Sunbelt Enterprises, employees struck from September
23 to November 22, 1983.81 The administrative law judge found
that the strike had been an unfair labor practice strike and that,
therefore, the employer had unlawfully refused to reinstate certain
strikers. 85 The National Labor Relations Board overturned this rul-
ing. At the outset of the strike, an employee told the employer that
the strike was "due to unfair labor practices" and picketers carried
signs identifying the strike as an unfair labor practice strike. At a
hearing, the same employee testified that the strike was precipitated
by the company's failure to reinstate one employee, Borders, and
the slowness of negotiations. Another employee testified that the
failure to reinstate Borders and the issuance of written disciplinary
warnings to leading union supporters caused the strike. The warn-
ings were issued to one employee on September 6 and 21, to another
"286 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. at 15-16, 126 L.R.R.M. 1307, 1312 (1987).
0 NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938); see also NLRB v.
Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 379, 66 L.R.R.M. 2737, 2738 (1967); Laidlaw Corp.,
171 N.L.R.B. 1366, 1369-70, 68 L.R.R.M. 1252, 1258 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 99, 103, 71
L.R.R.M. 3054, 3058 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920, 73 L.R.R.M. 2537 (1970).
82 286 N.L.R.B. No. 4, slip op. at 3-4, 127 L.R.R.M. 1092, 1093 (1987).
" Id. at 3, 127 L.R.R.M. at 1093.
" 285 N.L.R.B. No. 144, slip op. at 7, 126 L.R.R.M. I363, 1366 (1987).
85 Id.
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employee on September 21, and to two other employees on Septem-
ber 23. 8"
The National Labor Relations Board concluded that because it
found the failure to reinstate Borders to be legal, and because the
slowness of negotiations had not been due to employer unfair labor
practices, the strike was not an unfair labor practice strike. Although
the Board agreed with the administrative law judge that the disci-
plinary warnings had been illegal, it concluded that the General
Counsel had failed to sufficiently prove a causal relationship be-
tween the warnings and the strike. 87 The Board relied on the fact
that an employee made no mention of the warnings when he spoke
to the plant manager on the clay the strike started and testimony of
the two employees that Borders' discharge, which was found to be
lawful by the Board, was a cause of the strike. 88
Similarly, in Chromalloy American Corp., the union struck after
the layoff of fifteen union supporters and the discharge of two
union supporters." The administrative law judge found both the
layoffs and discharges to have been discriminatorily motivated and
concluded that the strike was an unfair labor practice strike. Con-
sequently, the judge ruled that the employer was not within its rights
to hire permanent replacements."" The National Labor Relations
Board disagreed with the judge as to the legality of the layoffs and
ruled that the employer would have implemented the layoff for
economic reasons even in the absence of the employees' union
activity.•' The Board then determined that the strike was based on
the layoffs and, thus, had not been an unfair labor practice strike.
The Board noted that the two illegal discharges took place on
January 14 and April 8, 1980, well before the April 22, 1981, strike
but the layoff occurred immediately before the strike. 92 In addition,
86 Id,
0 Id. at 7-8, 126 L.R.R.M. at 1366.
88 1d. at 8, 126 L.R.R.M. at 1366. Compare American Gypsum Co., 285 N.L.R.B. No. 16,
slip op., 128 L.R.R.M. 1105 (1987). In American Gypsum, the Board concluded that the strike
was an unfair labor practice strike despite finding that protracted refusal to arbitrate was not
illegal. Id. at 4, 6, 128 L.R.R.M. at 1107, 1108. The administrative law judge had found the
refusal to arbitrate an ttnfair labor practice that contributed to causing the strike. Id. at 5,
128 L.R.R.M. at 1107-08. The Board relied on the fact that union officers had told employees
about the employer's unlawful scheduling changes and refusal to process grievances as well
as the lawful refusal to arbitrate. Id. at 6, 128 L.R.R.M. at 1108.
89
 286 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. at 3-4, 126 L.R.R.M. 1307, 1308 (1987).
" Id. at 15-17, 128 L.R.R.M. at 1312-13.
0 Id. at 10, 126 L.R.R.M. at 1310.
92 id. at 16-17, 126 L.R.R.M. at 1312.
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the Board found persuasive several pieces of evidence: soon after
picketing began, the general manager asked striking employees
what they wanted, and one replied that the layoff was "unfair" and
that the employees should be reinstated; one employee testified that
a union meeting had discussed picketing in connection with the
layoffs; and two employees testified that the layoff was the basis of
their decision to participate in the strike and that they thought the
layoff was "unfair" or an "unfair labor practice." 93 Based on the
timing of the strike, and the fact that the strikers failed to mention
the discharges, the Board held that the strike was caused by the
layoff, not by the earlier discharges. The Board reached this deci-
sion even though leaflets distributed by the strikers stated that the
strikers would return to work when the employer reinstated the
laid-off employees and the two employees who had been illegally
discharged the previous year.
These cases demonstrate the potential difficulty a union may
face where it asserts a number of unfair labor practices. If one of
the challenged employer actions is ultimately held not to have been
an unfair labor practice, there is a danger that the Board will find
the strike to have been caused by that action and not the others.
Thus, a union must be careful to communicate the message that
the strike is in protest of each and every alleged unfair labor prac-
tice. To focus on one is to run the risk of the employees in Sunbelt
Enterprises and Chromalloy American Corp. Further, the Board's reli-
ance on what employees said to a supervisor on the picket line
during the strike and on their testimony at a hearing creates an
additional risk for the union. The employees no doubt thought that
they were establishing the strike as an unfair labor practice strike
by their statements and testimony, inasmuch as they thought the
layoffs were illegal, as, indeed, did the administrative law judge. If
the Board continues to give such weight to statements made by
striking employees, unions will, in effect, have to give strikers a
script with which to protect themselves from leading and self-serv-
ing employer questions.
These cases also raise a question as to the basis for, and impor-
tance of, an employer's "right" to hire permanent replacements. If
an employer has committed unfair labor practices prior to or during
a strike, should the benefit of the doubt as to whether such unfair
labor practices caused or prolonged the strike always go to the
"Id,
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wrongdoing employer, as it seems to in Sunbelt Enterprises and Chrom-
alloy American, or should it go to the employees who will otherwise
lose their right to reinstatement? 94
D. Rights of Employees During a Strike
Recent decisions of the National Labor Relations Board also
deal with the rights of replaced strikers and with the rights of
employees disabled at the time the strike begins.
1. Rights of Replaced Strikers
With regard to replaced strikers, the Board has recognized that
although economic strikers may be permanently replaced, they re-
tain the right to make unconditional offers.of reinstatement, to be
reinstated upon such offers if' positions are available, and to be
placed on a preferential hiring list upon such offers if positions are
not available at the time of the offer. 95
 Thus, in Hilton Hotels Corp.,
the Board determined that the employer had failed to establish that`
two strikers' positions had been occupied by permanent replace-
ments when they made their unconditional offer to return. 96
 For
this reason, the employer was held to have violated the National
Labor Relations Act in refusing to reinstate them.
Whether an employer violates the law by threatening strikers
with replacement will turn on the legality of the threat and the
accuracy of the representation. In Chromalloy American Corp., the
Board held that the employer did not violate the Act when it sent
letters to economic strikers telling them that if they did not return
to work by a certain date, management would permanently replace
those who had not returned to their jobs. The Board reasoned that
94
 Indeed, if an employer is allowed to rest a "reasonable belief" of striker misconduct
sufficient liar discharge on the mere issuance of an unfair labor practice comptaini by the
General Counsel, Gem Urethane Corp., 284 N.L.R.B. No. 122, slip op., 128 L.R.R.M. 1092
(1987), why should not the union be able to premise an unfair labor practice strike on
conduct that is the subject of both an unfair labor practice complaint and a finding by an
administrative taw,
 judge that such conduct has occurred, was an unfair labor practice, and
caused the strike? Although a reasonable belief test would admittedly be a change in the law,
it might better comport with the protection Congress intended for strike activity and serve
to deter employer bargaining conduct close to the line of illegality.
95
 NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 380-81, 66 L.R.R.M. 2737, 2739 (1967);
Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366, 1369-70, 68 L.R.R.M. 1252, 1258 (1968), enforced, 419
F,2d 99, 103-06, 71 L.R.R.M. 3054, 3058-60 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920, 73
L.R.R.M. 2537-38 (1970).
96
 287 N.L.R.B. No. 56, slip op., 127 L.R.R.M. 1158 (1987) (supplementing 272 N.L.R.B.
488, 488-89, 1 i 7 L.R.R.M. 1298 (1984)).
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the letters "lawfully informed the strikers that they were subject to
permanent replacement.""7 Subsequent letters that advised employ-
ees they had been permanently replaced and thus were "no longer
employed" by the employer were found illegal.•' These letters went
further than merely advising employees they had been replaced.
The "no longer employed" language misstated the law by seemingly
indicating to employees that they had been discharged for their
strike activity.• Then Chairman Dotson dissented, arguing that the
letters were not illegal and that, in light of earlier letters stating that
the employer recognized employees' right to strike and discussed
only permanent replacement, the employees would not reasonably
have believed themselves discharged.'" The majority responded:
"'Permanent replacement' and 'permanently replaced' are, after all,
terms of art; their meanings are well understood by labor law prac-
titioners, but perhaps not by most employees."'"' Thus, the majority
concluded that the employer had illegally discharged the eleven
strikers to whom the "no longer employed" letters had been sent.
Finally, in June, 1988, the National Labor Relations Board
issued a decision that seems to expand an employer's use of replace-
ments and further limit the rights of replaced economic strikers. In
Aqua-Chem, Inc., the Board held that an economic striker who has
been permanently replaced and who unconditionally offers to re-
turn to work is entitled to do so only if the General Counsel estab-
lishes a prima facie case that the permanent replacement has de-
parted without a reasonable expectancy of recall.'° 2 In Aqua-Chem,
fifteen employees were laid off for an indefinite period and told to
look for other jobs and apply for unemployment compensation.
Fourteen of the fifteen laid off were permanent replacements.
When the employer began recalling employees, it took the position
that the layoff of replacements did not create vacancies and that
replacements could be recalled over replaced strikers.'"
"286 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. at 11, 126 L.R.R.M. 1307, 1310 (1987).
" Id. at 12-13, 126 L.R.R.M. at 1311. The Board quoted Eagle Comtronics, Inc., 263
N.L.R.B. 515, 516, 111 L.R.R.M. 1005, 1006 (1982), for the proposition that an "employer
may address the subject of striker repliiceinent without fully detailing the protections" enjoyed
by economic strikers, and that an employer's statements on job status are not coercive as long
as they are consistent with the law. 286 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. at 12, 126 L.R.R.M. at 1311.
99 286 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. at 13-14, 126 L.R.R.M. at 1311-12.
130 /d. at 22-24, 126 L.R.R.M. at 1313-14.
mIld. at 14, 126 L.R.R.M. at 1:311.
102 288 N.L.R.B. No. 121, slip op. at 7, 128 L.R.R.M. 1237, 1239 (1988).
' 05 Id. at 3-4, 128 L.R.R.M. at 1238.
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The administrative law judge reasoned that an economic layoff
of permanent replacements for a prolonged indefinite period was
per se a vacancy triggering the reinstatement rights of unreinstated
strikers.'° 4
 The Board panel majority disagreed with this analysis,
ruling that it "fails to satisfactorily take into account the employer's
right to permanently replace economic strikers and to assure the
replacements of the permanency of their positions."'" The Board
panel majority stated that economic layoff of replacements did not
necessarily create a vacancy triggering the rights of replaced strik-
ers. The majority purported to balance the employer's rights to
replace economic strikers with the rights of replaced strikers. The
Board held that whether a vacancy is created is to be tested by the
reasonableness of the laid off replacements' expectation of recall.
This expectation is to be measured by objective standards including
the employer4 business history, future plans, the length and cir-
cumstances of the layoff, and what employees were told by the
employer concerning recall.' 06 In the circumstances of this case,
held the Board, a vacancy was created because of the prolonged
and indefinite nature of the layoff. Thus, the employer violated the
National Labor Relations Act by recalling laid off replacements
instead of economic strikers who had unconditionally offered to
return to work.'"
The rule announced in Aqua-Chem is inconsistent with prior
Board law that has allowed an employer to recall from layoff per-
manent replacements ahead of unreinstated strikers only in such
narrow circumstances as a temporary layoff of very short duration.
In Bancroft Cap Co., for example, the Board found no violation of
law where the employer recalled permanent strike replacements
ahead of unreinstated strikers because the permanent strike re-
placements had been laid off for only a few days due to a shortage
of materialsi 08 In Giddings & Lewis, Inc., the Board clearly limited
Bancroft in rejecting the administrative law judge's holding that,
under Bancroft, unreinstated strikers do not have a statutory right
of recall ahead of laid off replacements who have a "reasonable
'" Id. at 4-5, 128 L.R.R.M. at 1238-39,
105 Id. at 5, 128 L.R.R.M. at 1238.
'" Id. at 6-7, 128 L.R.R.M. at 1239.
107 1d. at 8-9, 128 L.R.R.M. at 1240. Member Johansen concurred as to the illegality of
the employer's actions, but disagreed with the majority's rule that the General Counsel has
the burden of proving vacancies, information that is uniquely within the employer's purview.
Id. at 13, 128 L.R.R.M. at 1240 ( Johansen, Member, concurring).
1" 245 N.L.R.13. 547, 547, 550-53, 102 L.R.R.M. 1961, 1962 (1979).
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expectancy of recall."'" The Board in Giddings & Lewis specifically
noted that the layoffs in Bancroft were for periods of two to seven
days and described Bancroft as permitting the recall of laid-off em-
ployees before unreinstated strikers only in situations involving "lay-
offs of relatively short duration such as would occur from acts of
God, brief parts or materials shortages, or relatively short-term loss
of business.""° The rule of Aqua-Chem, however, is not necessarily
limited to layoffs of short duration caused by factors beyond an
employer's control.
Further, Aqua-Chem may place strikers' reinstatement rights
within the control of an employer, who can determine to hire so
many permanent replacements as to require a later layoff and who
controls what laid off replacements are told about recall. The em-
ployer, too, can determine the length and circumstances of layoff.
Finally, as Member Johansen noted, the General Counsel should
not have the burden of proving vacancies when the existence of
vacancies is an issue uniquely within the employer's knoWledge, not
the General Counsel's." t At some point, one must ask when the
replacement of strikers and retention of replacements, even after
layoff, becomes inherently destructive of employee rights. One must
also ask whether the employer's "right" to hire replacements should
be placed on the same footing via a balancing test as the employee's
Section 7 right to strike, which is the •basis for his or her right to
reinstatement.
2. Benefits Paid to Disabled Employees
In Texaco, Inc., 112 the National Labor Relations Board consid-
ered the issue of whether an employer may end payments to dis-
abled employees when a strike begins. In Texaco, the Board over-
ruled the coercive effects test of Emerson Electric' 13 and applied the
Great Dane test" 4
 in finding that the struck employer failed to es-
1 "9 255 N.L.R.B. 742, 744, 106 L.R.R.M. 1391, 1393 (1981), enforcement denied, 675 F.2d
926, 110 L.R.R.M. 2121 (7th Cir. 1982).
"° Id.
"' 288 N.L.R.B. No. 121, slip op. at 13-15, 128 L.R.R.M. at 1239-40.
" 2
 285 N.L.R.B. No. 45, slip op., 126 L.R.R.M. 1001 (1987).
" 3
 E,L. Wiegand Div., Emerson Elec. Co., 246 N.L.R.B. 1143, 103 L.R.R.M. 1073 (1979),
enforc'ed in part, 650 F.2d 463, 107 L.R.R.M. 2112 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S, 939,
109 L.R.R.M. 2778 (1982).
114
 NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26, 65 L.R.R.M. 2465 (1967). The Court in
Great Dane set forth the following test for violations turning on unlawful motivation:
First, if it can reasonably be concluded that the employer's discriminatory con-
duct was "inherently destructive" of important employees rights, no proof of
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tablish a legitimate and substantial business justification for termi-
nating the accident and sickness benefits of three disabled employ-
ees and for terminating pension credits to one disabled employee. 15
In the same case the Board held legal the employer's refusal to
continue paying employee health insurance premiums during the
strike. 16
 Accident and sickness benefits as well as pension credits
were viewed as accrued benefits, the denial of which during a strike
created an inference of unlawful conduct that was not rebutted by
the employer."' By contrast, the employer's continued payment of
health insurance premiums was not perceived to be an accrued
benefit." 5
The significance of the change in analysis was demonstrated in
five cases involving Amoco Oil Co.,"° in which the Board applied
the principles set forth in Texaco. It concluded that the employer
had come forward with sufficient business reasons to justify the
discontinuance of sickness and disability payments as well as occu-
pational illness and injury benefits during a strike and that the
discontinuance of benefits was lawful.' 2° The company had main-
tained a "closed gate" policy during the strike under which no
member of the bargaining unit was permitted to work, whether he
or she wished to or not. The benefits had been uniformly provided
only to employees who were (1) sick and disabled and (2) prevented
by reason of such sickness or disability from working a shift they
an antiunion motivation is needed and the Board can find an unfair labor
practice even if the employer introduces evidence that the conduct was mod-
vated by business consideration. Second, if the adverse effect of the discrimi-
natory conduct on employee rights is "comparatively slight," an antiunion mo-
tivation must be proved to sustain the charge if the employer has come forward
with evidence of legitimate and substantial business justifications for the con-
duct. Thus, in either situation, once it has been proved that the employer
engaged in discriminatory conduct which could have adversely affected em-
ployee rights to some extent, the burden is on the employer to establish that it
was motivated by legitimate objectives since proof of motivation is most acces-
sible to him.
Id. at 34, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2469 (emphasis in original).
115 Texaco, Inc., 285 N.L.R.B. No. 45, slip op. at 18, 126 L.R.R.M. at 1007.
" 6 Id. at 19, 126 L.R.R.M. at 1007.
117 Id. at 16-18, 1'26 L.R.R.M. at 1006-07.
" 6 Id. at 19, 126 L.R.R.M. at 1007.
"g Amoco Oil Co., 285 N.L.R.B. No. 117, slip op., 126 L.R.R.M. 1265 (1987); Amoco
Oil Co., 286 N.L.R.B. No. 80, slip op., 126 L.R.R.M. 1268 (1987); Amoco Oil Co., 286
N.L.R.B. No. 38, slip op., 126 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1987); Amoco Oil Co., 286 N.L.R.B. No. 40,
slip op.., 126 L.R.R.M. 1271 (1987); Amoco Oil Co., 286 N.L.R.B. No. 39, slip op., 126
L.R.R.M. 1273 (1987).
120 285 N.L.R.B. No. 117, slip op. at 6-9, 126 L.R.R.M. 1265, 1267-68.
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otherwise would be scheduled to work. Because sick and disabled em-
ployees would not have been scheduled to work because of the
closed gate policy, they were deemed ineligible for the benefits.
Because the policy had been uniformly applied in non-strike situ-
ations, the Board found it non-discriminatory.'" Finally, the Board
ruled that there was no evidence that the company's conduct was
inherently destructive of employee's rights.I 22 The risk to strikers
and unions, of course, is that employers reading Texaco and Amoco
may attempt to restructure their benefit plans to make it more
difficult for employees to collect benefits during a strike.
E. Withdrawal of Recognition
The issue of withdrawal of recognition after a strike is tied to
all of the above subjects. The National Labor Relations Board re-
cently restated what it considers the controlling principles of law in
Station KKHI:
Absent unusual circumstances, there is an irrebuttable
presumption that a union enjoys majority status during
the first year following its certification. On expiration of
the certification year, the presumption of majority status
continues but may be rebutted. An employer who wishes
to withdraw recognition after a year may do so in one of
two ways: (1) by showing that on the date recognition was
withdrawn the union did not in fact enjoy majority status,
or (2) by presenting evidence of a sufficient objective basis
for a reasonable doubt of the union's majority status at
the time the employer refused to bargain.'"
Cases arising during the 1987-88 Survey period have, for the
most part, recognized that the test is not an easy one to meet.' 24 In
Curtin Matheson. Scientific, Inc., the employer's evidence in support
of its doubt of the union's majority status consisted of (I) the fact
that five of the twenty-seven original unit employees crossed the
picket line at the beginning of the strike; (2) the resignation of two
employees; (3) the hiring of twenty-nine replacement workers who
crossed the picket line; and (4) statements by seven employees.' 25
12I Id. at 7, 126 L.R.R.M. at 1267.
L22 hl. at 8, 126 L.R.R.M. at 1267,
L23
 284 N.L.R.B, No. 113, slip op. at 4, 125 L.R.R.M. 1281, 1282 (1987).
104 For a general treatment of the subject of withdrawal of recognition, sec Ray, With-
drawal of Recognition from an Incumbent Union Under the National Labor Relations Act: An
Appraisal, 28 VILL. L. REV. 869 (1983).
125 287 N.L.R.B. No. 35, slip op. at 7-8, 127 L.R.R.M, 1114, 1116 (1987).
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In holding the employer to have acted unlawfully, the Board noted
that failure to join a strike does not necessarily constitute a repu-
diation of union representation, that statements critical of how a
union conducts the strike do not necessarily constitute repudiation,
and that no presumption could be made as to the union sentiments
of the replacements.' 26
Withdrawal of recognition cannot be valid if the loss of support
is due to employer unfair labor practices.' 27 Thus, the determina-
tion of whether pre-strike and post-strike bargaining has been con-
ducted in good faith can be crucial. The link is demonstrated in
Gulf States Manufacturers, Inc., a case in which the employer was
accused of unlawful surface bargaining and unlawful withdrawal of
recognition.' 28 A majority of the Board panel found lawful both the
employer's bargaining activity and its withdrawal of recognition
after it received a petition signed by ninety-two of the 120 unit
employees stating that said employees no longer wished to be rep-
resented by the union. Consequently, the majority held that the
employer did not violate the National Labor Relations Act when it
unilaterally implemented post withdrawal changes in wages and
benefits and layoffs. 129
In dissent, Member Johansen argued that the employer had
engaged in dilatory bargaining and had unlawfully withdrawn rec-
ognition. He pointed out that from October 24, 1980, to November
11, 1981, the parties met for only twelve bargaining sessions and
one informal discussion despite union efforts to meet far more
often.'"" Member Johansen's dissenting opinion chronicled numer-
ous occasions on which management representatives failed to keep
promises to set up bargaining sessions and were unavailable for
bargaining for weeks at a time.'"' He argued that the company's
insistence on infrequent bargaining sessions combined with its re-
fusal to provide information relevant to negotiations constituted a
refusal to meet at reasonable times and evidenced a desire to avoid
12LL Id. at 8-9, 127 L.R.R.M. at 1116-17; see also Station KKH1, 284 N.L.R.B. No. 113,
slip op., 125 1..R.R.M. 1281 (1987) (no presumption with regard to strike replacements);
Century Papers, Inc., 284 N.L.R.15, No. 126, slip op., 126 L.R.R.M. I360 (1987) (withdrawal
of recognition unlawful where employees' alleged dissatisfaction with union consisted of
criticism but not repudiation of union).
L27 See Ray, supra note 124, at 883.
128 287 N.L.R.13 No. 4, slip op., 127 L.R.R.M. 1182 (1987).
' 22 Id. at 2, 127 1-.R.R.M. at 1182.
Id. at 9, 127 L.R.R.M. at 1184 (,Johansen, Member, dissenting in part).
Id. at 7-9, 127	 at 1183-84 ( Johansen, Member, dissenting in part).
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reaching agreement. Thus, in Member Johansens's view, the em-
ployer was not free to withdraw recognition. 132
The Gulf States case demonstrates the consequences of relaxing
restrictions on employers at the bargaining table and during the
strike. if an employer bargains without a good faith desire to reach
agreement or bargains regressively after a strike, settlement is un-
likely. Delays can create disaffection among some bargaining unit
members and cause others to permanently leave the bargaining
unit. Disaffection and defections can make it easier for an employer
to withdraw recognition. Further, and more importantly, if em-
ployer bargaining behavior that is regressive, disruptive, or in bad
faith is not deemed an unfair labor practice, a strike caused by such
activity will not be an unfair labor practice strike and the employer
may hire and retain permanent replacements. Persons who have
crossed a union's picket line to take strikers' jobs are far more likely
to be willing to provide the . employer a basis for withdrawal by
openly rejecting the union than are employees who have been union
members under past contracts.
IV. CONCLUSION
Many of the decisions discussed above protect employee and
union rights in a strike setting to a lesser degree than the decisions
of prior National Labor Relations Boards. it is the effect of these
decisions when read together, however, that defines their real im-
pact because the effect of each is related to and enhances the impact
of the others. Allowing management, after a strike begins, to take
almost retaliatory measures at the bargaining table without defining
such conduct as unlawful, 133 and broadening the range of activities
for which strikers can be discharged, 134 means that strikes pro-
longed by such bargaining practices and discharges will not be
unfair labor practice strikes and replaced strikers will not be entitled
to reinstatement at the end of the strike. Making it more difficult
for unions to prove that strikes were precipitated by even proven
unfair labor practices 135 has the same effect of reducing the rein-
statement rights of strikers and enhancing an employer's ability to
permanently replace strikers. The job security of replaced strikers
is further diminished by a decision that provides that, even after
' 32 Id. at 9-10,127 L.R.R.M. at 1184 ( Johansen, Member, dissenting in part).
1 " See supra notes 33-61 and accompanying text.
'' See supra notes 62-78 and accompanying text.
'" See supra notes 79-94 and accompanying text.
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being laid off, a strike replacement can have greater reinstatement
rights than a replaced striker despite the fact that such striker has
unconditionally offered to return to work and has substantially
more seniority than the replacement. 136 Read together, these deci-
sions indicate that striking employees are increasingly vulnerable,
through replacement, to what is almost the functional equivalent of
discharge. Finally, if regressive post-strike bargaining, discharge of
strikers, and maintaining employment of replacements even after
layoff are not illegal, then striking employee disaffection or defec-
tion caused by these acts, as well as the natural antipathy of replace-
ments for the union that is trying to get them out, can help the
employer to build a case, under the current state of the law, for
withdrawing recognition.'" If withdrawal succeeds, employees are
left without a union. It is not cynical to suggest that at least some
employers plan their post-strike strategy with this end in mind. In
summary, the law provides less protection than it did to unions and
those they represent.
With the strike weapon less effective and the possibility of
replacement greater, unions may have to explore other means of
pressuring the employer. Publicity and product boycotts will become
more important. Other means may be explored as well. The United
Paperworkers International Union, for example, is reported to have
waged its strike against International Paper with new tactics includ-
ing targeting firms that share board directors to urge settlement or
resign from the board. Major stockholders are asked to sell their
stock and a caravan of fifty strikers travels from town to town
publicizing the strike and seeking aid from other labor support-
ers. 138
In addition, unions that are strong enough may decide to pro-
tect themselves at the bargaining table from the deterioration of
legal protection. In Chicago Typographical Unions, No. 16 v. Chicago
Tribune Co., a federal district court enforced a "Supplemental
Agreement" that provided for permanent employment for union
members subject only to discharge for cause and provided that while
the agreement was suspended by a strike, it resumed immediately
upon settlement of the strike.'" The court read the agreement to
136 See supra notes 95-111 and accompanying text.
137 See supra notes 123-32 and accompanying text.
1 " New Strike Tactics Against International Paper, 127 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 154 (Feb. 1,
1988).
136 648 F. Stipp. 592, 593-94, 124 L.R.R.M. 2771, 2773 (N.D. 111. 1986).
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require the employer to return strikers to their jobs when the unions
made an unconditional offer to return to work even though re-
placements had been hired."" Even more explicit agreements are
possible.
With the devaluation of the strike weapon for unionized work-
ers and the growing resistance of employers to further organization,
unions may turn to Congress for benefits and protections employees
have been unable to achieve at the bargaining table. In some cases,
Congress will be asked to help unions be more effective by amend-
ing the National Labor Relations Act. On May 10, 1988, for ex-
ample, Representative Joseph Brennan, a Democrat from Maine,
introduced a bill, H.R. 4552, to restrict an employer's right to hire
permanent replacements during a strike."' The bill would amend
the Taft-Hartley Act to make it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to hire or threaten to hire permanent replacements for
striking workers during the first ten weeks of a strike. Brennan
stated that the proposed legislation was necessary to "restore the
spirit of the collective-bargaining process" and that the legislation
"will give the workers involved in the labor dispute 10 weeks of
protection before they can in effect be fired by management by the
hiring of permanent replacements. "'42
Congress will also be asked to provide benefits and protections
directly. Representative Howard Berman has referred, for example,
to a "growing perception" in Congress that the National Labor
Relations Act has failed to guarantee employees relatively equal
power with their employers, and in light of the low level of union
representation in the workforce "has become increasingly insignif-
icant."" 3 For this reason, he sees the polygraph, high-risk notifica-
tion, and family and medical leave bills as responsive to the increas-
ing need to regulate the workplace directly.
Finally, one must wonder how calls for increased labor man-
agement cooperation will fare if unions are perceived to be of
decreasing influence and power, even at the bargaining table. For
cooperative endeavors to succeed, managers must surrender both
autonomy and information, sacrifices that may more easily be ob-
tained by a bargaining partner perceived to be strong.
140 Id, at 595, 124 L.R.R.M. at 2773.
141 See Protection for Strikers, 128 Lab. Rd. Rep. (BNA) 126 (May 23, 1988).
"2 Id.
L 1  Berman, Labor Legislation Before the 100th Congress, 10 1NDUS. REL. Li. 51, 57 (1988).
